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SECTION V.-DISCUSSION OF THE CASE ON PRINCIPLE.
It is neither possible nor desirable in the scope of this paper
to go deeply into the subject of judicial legislation, nor is such
its purpose. This work was undertaken, primarily, to show
that the Supreme Court of the United States is holding two
inconsistent positions. If we succeed in showing that, on principle, one of the two must be abandoned we shall feel amply
repaid. This inconsistency will be dealt with in the section
on Jurisdiction. The present section will. be devoted to an
endeavor to develop a little more clearly than the cases disclose the theory upon which the courts have been working to
reach the conclusions which we have just noted, and to a
discussion of the soundness or unsoundness of that theory.
What the courts have said, whether rightly or wrongly, is
this: The legislature passes a law, which we will call A. The
State Supreme Court interprets the law to belvalid; this interpretation which is final and conclusive, we will call B. The
593
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two combine and the law becomes AB, and is now complete.
Subsequently, the court declares the law void. This last
interpretation we will call V. The question before the court
was this: Are rights acquired under AB to be lost by construction V, and the court said No.
The reasoning runs about as follows: One who relies upon
the faith of A really relies upon the accuracy of an interpretation, which he has himself, put upon the words of the act.
He may think that the act is valid, when it is really void, but
he cannot complain for a loss occurring through his own
error, and is not, therefore, protected. The theory is that A
alone is incomplete, because the legislative body in this country
has no power, as in Europe, to pass upon the validity of its
own statutes, and thus to guarantee rights from the moment
of their passage; that no rights, therefore, can be acquired
until the proper court has declared authoritatively that the
law is valid. But as soon as this has been done, then the
individual is fully protected. He is protected as to A, because
the legislature cannot impair his contract by its repeal; he is
protected as to B, because the court cannot impair his contract, by varying its ruling and declaring the law void. This,
in brief, is without question what the courts have laid down as
law, in those cases which we have examined.
To reach this conclusion it is, of course, necessary to hold
that rights may be acquired under a statute afterwards declared to be void. This, in turn, rests upon the theory that a
judicial decision, when it construes a state statute, does not
merely interpret, but helps to make the law, and that a subsequent judicial decision altering that construction is a "law,"
within the meaning of the federal clause forbidding the state to
pass "laws" impairing the obligation of contracts; and that the
federal courts may, for that reason, refuse to apply it. In other
words, the whole principle at the bottom of Gelpcke v. Dubuque,
and all the cases following it, rests upon the assumption, not
expressed, it is true, but there, nevertheless, that the function
of the Supreme Court of a state, when determining the validity
or invalidity of a state statute, is, in its nature, a legislative and
not a judicial function.
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We fully realize that we shall be treading on very delicate
ground if we consider a theory which recognizes that a court's
decision may partake of a legislative character. Most of those
writers who have supported the case, have carefully avoided
the admission that the decision involves this theory, or else
have contented themselves with the simple statement that the
courts have decided the matter. We do not feel-satisfied to
stop 'at this point. We believe, in the first place, that it'is
a more honest treatment of the case to take the bull by the
horns, and admit the principle in its full significance, and, in
the second place, we are desirous to see if the rule can be harmonized with the great body of law, of which it forms a part..
A. The rile in Gelpcke v. Dubuue has never been disputed
by authority.
Under this phase of the question we will start with the
statement, upon which some writers have been content to rest
their support of this case, that in this country the courts have
laid it down as a rule of law that whenever the Supreme Court
of a state determines as to the validity of a statute such decision makes a part of the law of the state-i. e., it is a decision
of a legislative character. In opposition to this it is said that
it is an ancient and uncontradicted principle, that the courts
do not make or change the law, but that they merely expound
and apply it; therefore, when a decision is reached, the true
theory is that the law always was as last expounded. This
was Mr. Justice Miller's great argument in his dissenting
opinion in Gelpcke v. Dubuque. He says if the courts declare
a law void, then it is void absolutely from the beginning, and
no rights can be acquired under it.
As we have shown, the courts have absolutely repudiated
this view, for they have enforced rights thus acquired in a
long line of well-considered opinions. In answer to the argument advanced by Mr. Justice Miller and others, who. press
the general rule as to the function of courts and judges, it is
said: "To this general doctrine there is one well-established
exception, as follows: 'After a statute has been settled by
judicial construction, the construction becomes, so far as
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contract rights are concerned, as much a part of the statute
as the text itself, and a change of decision is, to all intents
and purposes, the same in its effect on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment.' "1
To this it is replied: "But there can be no exception to a
universal and positive rule of law, and unless you can show
some reason for your exception you cannot support it on principle." This, then, is now the situation-one side pointing to
a long line of Supreme Court decisions to justify the exception, the other citing a positive rule of law.
We wish, at this point, to go a step farther. We propose
to show that the rule, as developed in these cases, is not really
an exception at all, because the general rule adduced by Mr.
Justice Miller et al. does not apply to it; but that is -a rule,
absolutely unique, concerning which there is no authority except in this country.
The rule that courts never make or change, but only interpret, law, was imported into this country from the common
law of England. We do not admit nor deny the principle as
applied to the common law, though -we confess a secret feeling
of approval with which we read the language of an old English judge who declared that he, for one, could not understand the theory that the common law had always existed,
unknown to man, from the beginning of time, and that the
courts were still striving to find out what it was; and who
intimated his belief that he himself, together with his companions, was helping to make that same common law.
But, however this may be, we confine our remarks strictly
to cases where state courts are interpreting the validity of
state statutes, and we say that the rule, as existing in England,
has no application to the case where a court is passing upon
the validity of a state statute, because in England the courts
have not, and never have had, the power to pass upon the
validity of an act of Parliament.
Not only is this true of England, but of all other countries
as well. Mr. Hannis Taylor, in his work "The Origin and
1 Ray v. Gas Co., sufira, p. 550.

GELPCKE VERSUS DUBUQUE.

Growth of the English Constitution," speaks of this peculiarity
in American law; and we must remember that the same remarks will apply to the national and state courts, for they
both have the same constitutional power to judge of the
validity of legislation.
He says:' "The Supreme Court of the United States has
no prototype in history. Judicial tribunals have existed as
component parts of other federal systems, but the Supreme
Court of the United States is the only court in history that
has ever possessed the power to finally determine the validity
of a national law. Such a jurisdiction necessarily arises out
of the American system of constitutional limitations upon the
legislative power-a system under which all judges, both
state and federal, possess the power, in their respective spheres,
to pass upon the validity of every law that can emanate from
a state or federal legislature. In the English system such a
jurisdiction could not exist, for the reason that the English
Constitution imposes no limitation upon its legislative assembly; there is no 'higher law' by which the English courts
can test the validity of an act of Parliament."
Without, at this point, going into the question as to whether
the function of the court in such cases is actually legislative or
judicial, enough has been said to show that the rule of law
adduced to overthrow the theory of these cases ought not to
be given an authoritative position. To say that in England
courts do not make, but only interpret, the common law, does
not prove that courts in America do not exercise different
functions when performing a different service.
Eliminating that precedent, we have left only the authority
of the United States Supreme Court. The principle of Gelpcke
v. Dubuque has never been questioned in that court. The
cases have refused-full recognition to the doctrine by disallowing writs of error to state courts, as we shall show in the last
section, but they have not attempted to overturn the foundation principle.
That principle is a unique rule, developed exclusively in this
14 Fd Vol. I, p. 73.
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country, and is an outgrowth of our peculiar system of laws.
Unless, therefore, the principle which we have shown to be at
the bottom of Gelpeke v. Dubuque is intrinsically wrong, the
case must be considered to be good law.
We will ask a further indulgence at this point, that we may
devote a portion of this section to the purpose of investigating
whether it may properly be said that the power to pass authoritatively upon the validity or invalidity of an act of legislature
is a power appertaining to the legislative department of government, or whether it is more correctly called a strictly judicial function.
B. Is the /unction of American courts, when deciding as to
the validity of leg islativc acts, a legislative orjudicialfunction f
We shall discuss this question under three topics:
(I) The status of the power to negative legislative acts in
European countries.
.(2) An examination of the opinions of the framers of the
Constitution, as expressed in the federal convention.
(3) The manner in which the exercise of the power was
received by the country.
(I) THE STATUS OF THE POWER TO NEGATIVE LEGISLATIVE
ACTS IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

As we are now about to discuss the nature of a power,
granted over one hundred years ago to one department of our
government, it is of the highest importance to see where that
power had hitherto rested in European countries, and what
was the prevailing opinion as to its nature.
There are two distinct methods of interpretation of laws,
recognized by both civil and common law.
(a) Authentic interpretation,which decides the validity or
invalidity of the law.
(b) Judicial interpretation, which, according to certain
rules, interprets the meaning of the law-making
power.
The first belongs to the legislative power; the second to
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the judicial. We find this rule laid down in "Merlin's Repertoire:"
"C'est au legislateur qu'i appartient naturelement d'interprter la loi: ejus est legen interpretari cujus est legem condere.
C'est une ina nie tirie du droit romain. Quis enir (disait
'Empereur Jusinien dans la loi r2 C. de legibus), legum enigmata solvere et aperire idoneus esse videbitur, nisi is cid soli
legislatorem esse concessum est. En France nos rois se sant
toujours reservi l'interpreatiaonde leur ordonances."'
Authentic interpretation has always been considered, in the
European countries, as a function of the supreme law-making
power. It overrules the interpretation of judges, if the two
conflict. It is said that this must be true, otherwise the legislative body would be deprived of part of its legitimate power,
which would thus be given over to the courts.
The German view is well expressed in the case of K. and
others v. The Dyke Board of Niedervieland: "The constitutional provision that well-acquired rights must not be injured,
is to be understood only as a rule for the legislative power
itself to interpret, and does not signify that a command given
by the legislative power should be left disregarded by the
judge because it injures well-acquired rights." This power,
declared to belong to the legislative body, is, it will be noted,
precisely the same which our courts possess of determining
if the law be contrary to "well-acquired rights," or, in other
words, if it be in contravention of the will of the people, as
expressed in their constitution.
In Switzerland, where they have a written constitution very
similar to ours, we find this rule even more plainly laid down.
J. M. Vincent, in his book entitled "State and Federal Government in Switzerland,"I says: "Contrary to the practice of
American courts, the Swiss cantonal tribunal does not try acts
of the legislature, because the legislature is regarded as the
final authority on its own act." Here the function which the

I Cited in Brinton Coxe's "Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation," p. 6o.
2 Decisions of the Reichsgericht in Civil Causes, Vol. IX, p. 233.
3P. 34.
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Swiss declare to be a legislative function is exactly the same
which we have delegated to our judiciary-i. e., the right to
decide between the authority of the constitution and of the
law enacted by the legislature.
Turning now to the country from which we derive more
directly our system of law, we find the same idea followed
out. Blackstone' says: "But if Parliament will positively
enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no
power in the ordinary forms of the constitution that is vested
with authority to control it; and the examples usually alleged
in support of this sense of the rule do none of them prove that,
where the main object of a statute is unreasonable, the judges
are at liberty to reject it, for that were to set the judicial power
above that of the legislature, which would be subversive of all
government." At the same time, Blackstone recognizes the
truth of the observation made by Locke, 2 where he says:
"There still remains inherent in the people a supreme power
to remove or alter the legislature, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them."
Thus we have, in all events, the same situation as in our
country, where the sovereignty resides in the people ultimately, but immediately in their representatives. And, in
this same situation, Blackstone declares that for the courts to
-have the power to choose between the will of the people and
the will of Parliament, would be to usurp the power of the
legislature.
In Nrotley v. Buck,3 the court say: "The words may probably go beyond the intention, but if they do, it rests with the
legislature to make an alteration; the duty of the court is only
to construe and give effect to the provisions."
It is, of course, impossible to give anything approaching a
thorough discussion of so great a question in this paper, but
enough has, perhaps, been said to illustrate the point. We
again recall the fundamental distinction between the two interpretations, the authentic or the authoritative, and the purely
I Vol. I, p. 9!.
2Of Parliament, p. 49.
3S Barn. & Cress. 16o.
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judicial. The latter does not enter into the discussion, for no
one questions the principles applied to it; but we have now
endeavored to show that the leading countries of the old
world have recognized with great unanimity that the former
interpretation belongs to the power which makes the law.
Hobbes says: "The legislator is he (not by whose authority
the law was first made, but) by whose authority it continues to
be law."'
This power, thus recognized to be legislative in its character, is in America delegated to the Supreme Courts of the
United States and of the several states. The question then
arises: Is there any ground for the statement that this power,
when in this country it is given to the courts, loses it6 legislative character and becomes purely a judicial function? We
are inclined to answer that question in the negative. We are
unable to conceive how a change of the body which executes
the power can change the inherent nature of the power itself.
Bowyer in his "Readings Before the Middle Temple,"
enunciates the theory, in pursuance of which so many writers
and judges have said the power of the courts to pass upon the
validity of a state statute is a purely judicial function. He
says :' "But the American courts are invested with a jurisdiction unknown to the constitution of this country. The
Constitution of the United States is a written constitution,
erected by delegation of powers from the people to the government; and the powers not delegated to the United States
by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. . . . It
follows from these fundamental principles, which, indeed, belong to every federal polity, that the constitution is the
supreme law which is the test of the validity of all other
laws. And the principle so well laid down by Montesquieu,
that the legislative must be separated from the judicial power,
applies to the instrument of the constitution. It follows that
the power of interpreting the laws, vested in the national
courts, involves necessarily the function to ascertain whether

1 Cited in
2 p.

Austin's Jurisprudence, Vol. I, p.

81 el seq.

201.
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they are conformable to the constitution or not; and if not so
conformable, to declare them void and inoperative. As the
constitution is the supreme law of the land, it becomes the
duty of the judiciary, in a conflict between the constitution
and the laws, either of Congress or of the state, to follow that
only which is of paramount obligation. .

.

. The judicial

power is thus made the guardian of the constitution. . .
This does not imply a superiority of the judicial over the
legislative power, though as a general proposition the authority
which can declare the acts of another void is superior to the
one whose authority may be declared void by the former.
The theory of the law on this subject deserves some examination. The act of a delegated authority, contrary to the commission or beyond the commission under which it is exercised,
is void. Diligenterfines mandati custodiendi sunt: nam qui
excedit, aliud quid facere videtur. He who acts beyond his
commission, acts without any authority from it. Now the
judicial power can declare void the acts of the legislative
power, where those acts are beyond the delegated power of
the legislature, and, therefore, not legislative acts except in
form only. Thus the judicial power is not placed above the
legislative power, because the former must obey the valid acts
-

of the latter."

This eminent writer first admits that the power to pass upon
the validity of legislative acts is in all other countries a legislative function, then he declares in America it naturally
belongs to the courts because
(a) The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and
(b) The Federal Government is one of delegated powers.
It is conceded that the power exercised by the American
courts, if exercised by English or Swiss or German or French
courts, would be legislation; but, it is said, it is in America a
judicial function, because the court does not of its own authority adjudge the law void, but merely chooses between two
laws, and enforces the one which is paramount.
To support this distinction is to declare that in all countries,
except the United States, the legislative power is absblutely
independent of all constitutional restriction, which is far from
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true. In Switzerland they have a written constitution very
similar to ours. The people are recognized. fully as the
sovereign power. What then is -the function of the legislature
of Switzerland? It determines, as a matter of interpretation,
that a particular law is consistent with the written constitution,
whcn it passes that law. This interpretation is authoritative
and final. The same function is exercised by the legislature
of Germany as we have seen. The legislature first decides
that a law, if passed, will be consistent with "well-acquired
rights," then it passes the law. This interpretation is nothing
but a balancing of the proposed law against the acknowledged
limitations imposed by the German Constitution. In England,
as we have pointed out, the law recognizes the ultimate
sovereignty to be in the people. It also recognizes Parliament to be the supreme legislative power; but by no means
does this mean that Parliament is actually unlimited. Its
acts must conform to the English Constitution, as evidenced
by that great body of definite and clear, though uhwritten,
precedents. It is said that Parliament technically has the
power to pass any law, no matter how unreasonable; but, at
the same time, it is conceded that practically Parliament
cannot do that, because, as Locke says, the people would
deprive them of the power of which they have proven themselves unworthy. Because the English people do not possess
the machinery which we do, their power is not any the
less real, nor any the less potent. Now when Parliament
goes to pass a law, what does it do ? It frames the bill, and
then in the exercise of its power to authoritatively interpret,
decides that the law will be consistent with the rights of the
British people.
This is done both by debate in the House of Parliament,
and by obtaining the opinions of judges, who not only sit in
Parliament for that purpose, but are expressly called in to
give their opinions in doubtful cases.
The constitutionality of the act is passed upon just as much
as if Parliament first blindly passed it, and then delegated the
authoritative power to interpret to a court. The act of passing the law decides both points as a finality. Is this any less

604
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real interpretation of a statute than the interpretation which
we exercise in this country?
We confess our inability to see the distinction contended for
by Mr. Bowyer. The constitution is recognized to be the
supreme law of the land in each of the four countries which
we have mentioned, and in at least two written constitutions
are expressly declared to be the supreme authority. As we
have shown, the act of interpretation, as performed by the
legislatures of those countries, is in its nature the same in all
respects as is performed in America by the courts. In both
cases the interpretation is a determination between two laws:
the constitution and the will of the legislative body, expressed
on the one hand by a bill framed, on the other, by a law
passed. In the one case the power to interpret its own laws
is recognized to be inherent in the legislative body. In the
other, that power is taken away from the legislature by the
people and given to the judiciary. Does that make it less a
legislative power? We are unable to see how the instrument
by which the power is executed can change its inherent nature.
In the second place, Mr. Bowyer says that contrary to European governments, the Federal Government of the United
States is one of purely delegated powers. We believe this
difference to be mainly one of degree, in that the limits beyond
which our governmental acts cannot be carried, are more
sharply defined, but we will avoid the whole discussion by
again calling attention to the fact that we are dealing only
with the power of a state court to declare a state statute void,
and that the state governments are governments not of delegated, but of inherent powers. Mr. Bowyer's remarks upon
this point have no application to our discussion.
We respectfully submit at this point the following conclusions :
(a) The power given to the Supreme Courts of the United
States and of the several states, to authoritatively interpret laws
passed by their respectivelegislatures,is precisely the same power
as that exercised by the legislative bodies of Europe, i. je., the
power to decide between the expressed will of the legislature,and
the constitution of the state.
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(b) This power is recognized in all nations, except the United
States, to belong, as of inherent rzi*-,ht, to the legislative departwnent of government.
It is proper to remark here that all this discussion is quite
apart from the right of any court, when applying a statute, to
judicially determine the meaning of its words.
(2)

AN

EXAMINATION

OF THE OPINIONS OF THE FRAMERS

OF THE CONSTITUTION, AS EXPRESSED IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION.

After this rather limited discussion, we have arrived at the
conclusion that the power to authoritatively determine between the fundamental law of the land, and a law passed by
the legislative body of that land, has always in Europe been
deemed to be a power appertaining to the legislature. Keeping that thought in mind, we now desire to devote a portion
of this section to a brief investigation of the manner in which
our courts were granted these extraordinary powers. In conducting this investigation, three things will be considered:
(a) The end which the framers of the Constitution had
in view.
(b) Methods proposed, by which it was intended to
accomplish this result.
(c) The clause or clauses in the Constitution, by virtue
of which, the courts obtained the power to pass
upon the validity of legislative acts.
(a)

THE 3 ND WHICH THE FRAMERS OP THE

CONSTITUTION HAD IN

VIV.

There is no difficulty in determining the "purpose of the
framers of the Constitution during the debates and proposals
culminating in the delegation of the whole question to the
judicial department. This intention was, to use the expression most often heard, "to put a check upon the legislative
department."
The statesmen of that day had had a severe object lesson
of the evils that could be inflicted by an unlimited legislative
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body, and they determined to provide against a repetition of
the experience.
It had already been provided in the proposed constitution,
that the powers of the legislature should be exercised only
within certain limits, but it was recognized that this was not
sufficient. It is true we find occasional references to the
power of the courts in such cases, but it is plain that the
members of the convention fully realized that, without more,
the legislative department would be dangerously powerful,
because they still retained the power to decide, whether their
action was, in fact, contrary to the Constitution. As will be
shown later, various plans were brought forward to accomplish this purpose, i. e., to make some power, outside of the
legislature itself, the judge of the validity of its laws.
Now, if, as is sometimes contended, the decision of this
question is purely a judicial' one, why was any further guarantee necessary? The same constitutional limitations, which
we have to-day, had already been drafted. The courts were
provided for, and to them it was proposed, of course, to give
full judicial power. It seems reasonable to suppose that the
idea that the legislature was the natural interpreter was present
in the minds of the men who were engaged in framing the
Constitution.
This is indicated by the language of Mr. Bedford, when
discussing a proposed check on the legislature. The report
reads: "Mr. Bedford was opposed to every check on the
legislature, even the council of revision first proposed. He
thought it would be sufficient to mark out in the Constitution the
boundaries to the legislative authority, which would give all the
requisite security to the rights of the other departments. The
representatives of the people were the best judges of what was
for their interest, and ought to be under no external control
whatever. The two branches would produce a suffi ient control
within the legislature itself. Mr. Bedford said, "It would be
sufficient to mark out the boundaries to the legislative authority" in the Constitution, and gave as his reasons, that in
1V.Elliot's Debates,

153.
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his opinion the representatives of the people are the best
interpreters of legislative acts. Clearly Mr. Bedford thought
that in the absence of express provisions to the contrary, the
legislature would be the interpreter. We conclude thaf the
convention recognized that some express provision must be
inserted, in order to take away from the legislature inherent
right to decide as to the validity of its own laws.
(b) METHODS PROPOSED BY WHICH IT WAS INTENDED TO

AccoM-

PLISH THz REsuLT.

The first problem that seems to have presented itself to
their minds, was how to force the states to observe the con-:
stitutional restraints laid upon them. They seemed to recognize that the extent of the constitutional restraints was to be
judged by the legislative department. The question was, by
which one, the national, or the state. Mr. Langdon, when a
proposition to give this power to the federal legislature was
before the convention, said: "He was in favor of the proposition. He considered it as resolvable into the question,
whether the extent of the national Constitution was to bejudged
of by the general or state governments."' He seemed to recognize but the two alternatives.
In pursuance of this purpose, and recognizing this principle,
the following resolution, embodied in the Virginia plan, was
proposed to the convention by Mr. Randolph:
"Resolved .
that the national legislature ought to be
empowered . . . to negative all laws passed by the several
states contravening, in the opinion of the nationallegislature,
the articles of the Union, or any treaty subsisting under the
' 2
authority of the Union.
This proposition, to vest the power of determining the
extent of the federal limitations in the national legislature,
was upheld in the most determined manner by such men as
Madison, Jefferson (who first proposed it), Randolph and
Pinckney. Their support of this proposition shows that they
I V.
2

V.

Elliot's Debates, 168.
Elliot's Debates, 128.
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considered the legislative power to be the natural judge of
questions of this character.
This proposal, in one form or another, was brought up
again and again, thoroughly debated and finally rejected, not
because of any inherent, wrong principle which it contained,
but because it was deemed inexpedient to adopt it, owing to
the procedural difficulty of applying it. Mr. Lansing, objecting, said: "It is proposed that the general legislature shall
have a negative on the laws of the states. Is it conceivable
that there will be leisure for such a task? There will, on the
most moderate calculation, be as many acts sent up from the
states as there are days in the year."' Mr. Dickinson favored
an absolute negative in the national legislature. He said:
"We must take our choice of two things. We must either
subject the states to the danger of being injured by that of the
national government, or the latter to the danger of being injured by that of the states. He thought the danger greater
from the states. To leave the matter doubtful would be
opening another spring of discord, and he was for shutting as
many of them as possible." 2 He did not seem to conceive
that the judiciary could fill this need. It is true in some
places we find vague references to the power of the judiciary
to judge of the laws, but it is impossible to believe that, at
this time, the framers of the Constitution had fully conceived
the feasibility of vesting such powers in the judiciary, or
they would not have considered that a like- power should be
given to the national legislature.
The observations last referred to were made on June 8,
1787, before the convention had more than begun its labors.
As the discussion went on, the convention leaned more and
more toward a plan to give over the whole matter to the
courts. They were inclined to this course for two reasons:
First, because of procedural difficulties as we have seen; and,
secondly, because the judiciary was recognized to be more
conservative and, therefore, less liable to radical action. On
July I7th, the clause granting a legislative negative was lost
V. Elliot's Debates, 2r5.
2 V. Elliot's Debates, 173.
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by a vote of three for and seven against. Mr. Madison favored it still because he thought nothing less would control
the states.' Mr. Morris and Mr.. Sherman favored giving the
2
matter over to the courts.
Immediately after the motion was lost, Mr. Martin, who had
been one of its active opponents, moved a resolution, which
vested in the judiciaries of the several states the authority to
decide between the acts of the national and of the state g6vernments. This motion was agreed to without dissent. The
convention apparently receiving it as a substitution for the
motion just lost. Mr. Brinton Coxe observes, "In finally rejecting the legislative negative, and overruling its previous
action, the convention took a step backwards only to make a.
leap forwards. Luther Martin's motion in favor of the plan
of what is now paragraph 2, Article VI, was, as before stated,
immediately offered and adopted without opposition, and
apparently without debate. Such action is incomprehensible,
if the framers intended to abandon what had been their avowed
object, as well as to abandon the measure by which they had
intended previously to secure that object. In first adopting
and then discarding a legislative negative to be applied with
legislative discrimination, and substituting therefor a judicial
discrimination applying a general clause of derogation, they
intended only to change the means of accomplishing their
object, and not to abandon that object itself."4 If Mr. Coxe's
reasoning be sound, we must conclude that the framers of the
Constitution, having first recognized as a legislative function
the power to judge as to the constitutionality of laws passed
by the state legislatures, which it was proposed to vest in the
national legislature, then concluded to accomplish the same
end by delegating this power to the courts. This delegation,
of course, could not change the nature of the power.
The legislative negative, however, was not yet entirely
killed. It came up twice more and was finally disposed of
1 V. Elliot's Debates, 321-2.
2 V. Elliot's Debates, 321-2.
S V. Elliot's Debates, 321-2.
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-only on September I'Sth. On that day the committee laid
before the convention a substitute for Article I, Section io,
which, after providing that no state should lay any imposts or
duties on imports, etc., etc., without the consent of Congress,
concluded: "and all such laws shall be subject to the revision
and control of Congress." 1 This was a last attempt to give
to Congress precisely the power which the courts of the several states and of the United States now exercise. The motion
was lost by a vote of seven to three.
This discussion of the legislative negative is here given to
show that, at first, the men who composed the convention
thought only of giving the discriminating power to a legislative body. That they abandoned the means on account of
procedural difficulties, mainly, and, keeping the same object
before them, delegated this power to the judiciary. The
avowed purpose of thus depriving the state legislatures of the
interpretation of their own laws, was to limit their power still
further -than could be done merely by constitutional restrictions, the extent of which they had the power to judge. As
this power was. taken from a legislative body, it must have
been a legislative power. Giving it to the judiciary did not
inake it a judicial power.
This was, perhaps the critical point in the-history of this
important question, when the eminent founders of our Constitution, though recognizing the character of the power with
which they were dealing, by a wise and provident policy,
took it away from the legislative department of government
and gave it to another department of co-ordinate authority,
thus permitting the one to be a check upon the other, constituting-the judiciary the perpetual safeguard of the liberties of
the people, protecting them against arbitrary usurpation of
power by the legislature.
There is little reason tb doubt that, had the legislative negative become a par of our Constitution, the power of authoritative interpretation of its own laws would have been given to
Congress, as a necessary adjunct of legislative power; and
- V. Elliot's Debates, 548.
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would have been -left in the state legislatures where it already
was, by virtue of the inherent sovereignty of the state. But,
having once decided that the judiciary could be entrusted with
so great a power to revise and check the acts of the legislature,
the conclusion was natural and logical, that it should be given
that power in all cases.
One other proposition should be discussed before we take
up the question of the actual delegation of -this power, and
that is the effort to establish a revisory council, composed of
executive and judges, who should pass upon the constitutionality of proposed laws. The measure was moved by Mr.
Madison. It provided that "every bill which shall have
passed the two houses, shall, before it becomes 'a law, be
severally presented to the President of the United States, and
to the judges of the Supreme Court, for the revision of each:"
It also made provision for passage, in spite of disapproval, by
certain specified majorities.
We wish, particularly, to call attention to the argument of
Mr. Mercer, who "heartily approved the motion. It is an
axiom that the judiciary ought to be separate from the legislative; but equally so that it ought to be independent of that
department. The true policy of the axiom is, that legislative
usurpation and oppression may be obviated. He disapproved
of the doctrine that the judges, as expositors of the Constitution,
sA'ould have authwriy to declare a law void. He thought laws
ought to be well and cautiously made, and then to be uncontrollable."1 Mr. Morris favored the motion. "Mr. Dickinson
was strongly impressed with the remark of Mr. Mercer, as to
the:power of the judges to set aside the law. He thought no
such power ought to exist. He was at the same time, at a
loss what expedient to substitute. The justiciar of Arrafon,
he observed, became by degree the law-giver."'
The remarks of these members lead us irresistibly to the
conclusion that they both considered that this power, about
to be given to the courts, was a legislative power, and that
they, for that reason, disapproved of it. It is clear' that the
x V. Elliot's Debates, 429.
2 V. Elliot's Debates, 429.
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idea was one comparatively new, and the members had not
yet concluded that it was a wise step. Mr. Madison favored
giving to the judiciary this power, but put his opinion on the
ground of utility, without replying to Mr. Mercer's suggestion
that they ought not to have the power for a priorireasons.
Indeed, it must be conceded that Mr. Mercer's suggestion
that laws should "be well and cautiously made," with advice
by judges, and then be uncontrollable, is one eminently reasonable and extremely difficult to answer. It would, at least,
have the merit of precluding the possibility of cases similar to
Gelpcke v. Dubuque ever arising.
However, the motion to provide a revisory council of judges
to examine laws before their passage, was lost,' and thus it
seemed, at last, to be definitely settled that the interpretation
of the laws should be given to the courts.
(c)

THE CLAusE OR CLAUsEs IN THE CONSTITUTION, BY VIRTUE OF

WHICH THE COURTS OBTAINED THE POWER TO PASS UPON THE VALIDITY

ol LEGisL&Tr

AcTs.

The importance of this question, as a means of determining
the opinions of the framers of the Constitution, cannot be
overestimated. If the power was not directly conferred by
the Constitution upon the courts, this would be competent
evidence that the framers were of the opinion that no such
express delegation was necessary; but that the courts already
possessed the power, as a strictly judicial function. We do
not find it necessary to enter into the discussion, whether this
power was expressly given or not, in view of the very able
and exhaustive book upon the subject which has decided the
question for us. Mr. Brinton Coxe, after a most searching
analysis of the Constitution and the opinions of its founders,
has come to the conclusion that the framers did intend, and
did actually confer, express authority upon the courts to declare laws invalid.
The clauses which confer this power are two in number.
Paragraph 2, Article VI, which lays upon the state courts the
1 V. Elliot's Debates, 429.
2

See "Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation."
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duty to decide between national and state laws, and Section
2, Article III, which extends the judicial power to all cases
arising under the Constitution of the United States. Mr.
Coxe observes "From this and the preceding chapter, it appears that paragraph 2, VI, and the beginning of section 2,
III, have a common origin. This fact is of much importance
in any commentary upon the Constitution. It is especially
important in this essay, which makes the following contentions concerning those constitutional texts:
(i) In part IV of the Historical Commentary, it is contended that the evidence makes it clear that the two texts
were closely connected in the framing thereof; and that the
framers intentionally framed them, so as to be adapted to each
other.
(2) In the Textual Commentary, it is contended that, independent of the extra-textual evidence, the two texts can be
shown to be so intimately related, that they are twin texts."'
As we have seen, paragraph 2 of Article VI was -adopted
without dissent, immediately after the defeat of the legislative
negative, and as Mr. Coxe declares, as a substitute therefor.
The clause giving to the judiciary power to decide all cases
arising under the Constitution of the Union, was not adopted
nor even proposeduntil August 2 7 th, after it had become evident
to the members of the convention that no other practicableplan
could be adoptedfor enforcing obedience to the Constitution.
On that day Dr. Johnson moved to insert the words "this
Constitution and the" before the word "laws," in the clause
which is now Article III, Section 2.2
That this vested a great and unusual power in the courts,
was realized. "Mr. Madison doubted whether it was not
going too far, to extend the jurisdiction of the court generally
to cases arising under the Constitution, and whether it ought
not to be limited to cases of a judiciary nature. The right
of expounding the Constitution, in cases not of this nature,
ought not to be given to that department." No one remarking upon this point, the motion was passed without dissent, to
1

P. 292.
V. Elliot's Debates, 483.
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make the alteration proposed, the reporter observing that ii
was understood by the members that the jurisdiction of the
couits was limited to cases of a judiciary nature.
In. this manner was granted to the courts a power never
before, in-the history of the world,, granted to a judicial body.
Mr. Madison was still not satisfied as to his point, and
moved "to strike out the beginning of the third section, 'The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,' and to insert the words
'the judicial power,'"" which was agreed to.
The convention apparently realized that they had given to
the courts a power which might be exercised in cases "not of
a judiciary nature," and Mr. Madison was anxious that it
should be limited to cases of that nature. This was the purpose of his last motion. The tables were now turned.. The
convention had been considering a means of checking the legislature. They decided to give a part of the legislative prerogative
to the courts. Fears now arose whether they had not gone
too far in giving to the courts the right to -expound the Constitution in all cases.- It was then suggested that the courts
sh6uld only use this power in cases "of a judiciary nature."
If the courts had no powers given them except those usually'
appertaining to courts, it would- of- course be an absurdity to
.speak of limiting their, action .to cases of a "judiciary nature."
It is clear from Mr. Madison's remark and the assent of the.
Assembly to it, that they fully realized that they had given
to the judicial department a power, which might be used not
only outside of the usual field of judicial 'action, but also
outside of the field in which the framers intended it to be
exercised
For this reason, they took additional precautions that the
courts might not unduly encroach upon the legislature by
r.ef-using to sanction laws which they might think to be im-:
proper. -That their fears" were not groundless, is seen-from
an examination of an ever-increasing multitude of- cases in
the state, courts, where these "judicial- bodies" have even
gone so far as to declare laws void, because they are opposed' V. Elliot's Debates, 483.

-GELPCKE VERSUS DUBUQUE.

.to the ."inalienable rights ".-which- beloig to every citizen. 1
The evident meaning of the framers was that this quasi-legislative power should not be exercised, except where there was
a-clear conflict between the Constitution and the law.

(3)THE MANNER IN WHICT-T THE

EXERCISE OF THE POWER

WAS RECEIVED BY THE. COUNTRY.

Before finally leaving this branch of the subject, it. may not
be out of place to see how the exercise of this power was
.viewed in cases in which it was first actually applied. We
cannot better summarize the matter than by a quotation from
the address of Mr. Battle, delivered before the Supreme Court
.Bench and Bar of North Carolina. He says, "These, our
earliest judges, are entitled to the eminent distinction of contesting with Rhode Island, the claim of being the first in the
United States to decide that the courts have the power and
duty to declare an act of the legislature,'which, in '.heir
opinion, is unconstitutional, to be null and void. The'doctrine
is so familiar to us, so universally acquiesced. in, that it is
.difficult for us to realize that when it was first mooted, the
judges who had the courage to declare it,-were fiercely
,denounced as. usurpers of power. - Speight; af.erwards governor, voiced a common .notion, when he declared that 'the
state was subject to three individuals, who united in their own
persons the legislative and judicial power, which'no nionarch
in England enjoys, which would be more despotic than the
Roman Triumvirate, and equally insufferable.' In Rhode
Island the legislature refused to re-elect judges who decided
an act, contrary to their charter, to be null and void. In
Ohio, in 1807, judges who had made a similar decision were
impeached, and a majority, but not two-thirds, voted to convict them. . . . New York follows with a similar decision in
1791. South Carolina in 1792. Maryland in 1802. The
Supreme Court of the United States in Marbury v. Madison
in I8OI."2
See Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431; State v. Goodwill, 33 W.
Va. i79; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98.
2

103 N.

C., 472-3.
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Although in a few isolated cases these powers had been
exercised by state courts before the Revolution, that they
could- not legitimately be exercised without express power
given by the Constitution, seems to be clear. This was the
cause of the fierce assault which was made upon those judges,
who dared to assume this function prior to, or immediately
following, the adoption of the Constitution. The objections
were put upon the ground that the function was a legislative
one. The power was defended, not on the theory that it was
one naturally belonging to the judiciary, so much as that
there was in America no other body competent or appropriate
to discharge this duty.
After the adoption of the Constitution this power was recognized by its defenders to be one, not inherently belonging to
the courts, but a "legislative judicial power" granted to them
by the Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall, whose opinion
in M1arbury v. Madison is most often quoted to show that he
considered this to be a judicial function, said, while arguing
the case of Ware v. Knowlton,' "The legislative authority of
any country can only be restrained by its own municipal constitution. This is a principle that springs from the very
nature of society; and the judicial authoritycan have no right
to question the validity of a law, unless such a jurisdiction is
expressly given by the Constitution."
As Mr. Marshall was one of the most prominent of those
men who conferred this power, he above all others should
have known its nature. His decision in Marbury v. Mfradison
does not contradict this view. He recognized the undoubted
right of the court to decide between the law and the Constitution, because he believed that power to have been conferred.
He says "The judicial power of the United States is extended
to all cases arising under the Constitution.
"Could it be the intention of those who gave this power to
say that, in using it, the Constitution should not be looked
into? That a case arising under the Constitution should be
decided without examining the instrument under which it arises?
13

Dall.

199-211.
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"This is too extravagant to be maintained."'
Mr. McMurtrie held the same view as Mr. Marshall as to
the original nature of the power,. but he differed with him as
to whether it had been properly conferred. He says in his
observations: "Let me ask whence is derived this power that
we are now discussing, that of declaring void a legislative act?
Was such a political power ever heard of -before? Did any
state' ever grant to its judicial functionaries the power -of
declaring and enforcing the limits of its own sovereignty?
What state before conferred on a court of justice, in determining the rights of two suitors, as a mere incident, and
without a hearing on behalf of the state, the power to determine that its legislative acts, approved and sanctioned by all
its statesmen for thirty years, had always been mere nullities
-nullities ab initijo?" 2 Mr. McMurtrie, however, finally
admits that such a power was granted, though he thinks
improperly.
In the course of a debate in the Senate on theJudiciary
System, in the year 1802, Mr. Breckenridge gave expression
to his opinion that the power given to the courts was a legislative power, and disapproved of it for that reason. He said :
"To make the Constitution a practical system, the power of
the courts to annul the laws of Congress cannot possibly exist.
My idea of the subject, in a few words, is that the Constitution
intended a separation only of the powers vested in the three great
departments, giving to each the exclusive authority of acting
on the subjects committed to each: That each are intended to
revolve within the sphere of their own orbits, are responsible
for their own motion only; and are not to direct or control
the course of others. That those, for example, who make the
laws, are presumed to have an equal attachment to, and interest
in, the Constitution are equally bound by oath to support it,
and have an equal right to give a construction to it. That
the construction of one department of the powers particularly
i Cr. 178-9.
2

P. 13, 14, 15, cited in Coxe on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional

Legislation.
3
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vested in that department, is of as high authority, at least, as
the construction given to it by any other department; that is,
it is in fact more competent to that department, to which
powers are exclusively confided, to decide upon the proper
exercise of those powers, than any other department to which
such powers are not entrusted, and who are not consequently
under such high and responsible obligations for their constitutional exercise; and that, therefore, the legislature would have
an equal right to annul the decisions of the courts, founded
on their construction of the Constitution, as the courts would
have to annul the acts of the legislature, founded on their
construction.
"Although, therefore, the courts may take upon them to
give decisions which go to impeach the constitutionality of a
law, and which for a time may obstruct its operation, yet
I contend that such a law is not the less obligatory, because
the organ through which it is to be executed has refused its
aid."
This quotation well expresses the views of those who oppose
this system of interpreting laws proposed by the Constitution.
Mr. Hamilton, in defence, thus replies to this view in the
Federalist:1 ",If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that
the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the
other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the
natural presumption, where it is not to be recollected from any
particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise
to be supposed that the Constitution could intend to enable
the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that
of their constituents."
In other words, Mr. Hamilton does not deny the nature of
the power, but declares that in a government where the legislative power is limited, it must be that the power to judge of
their own laws shall be taken away from them, otherwise they
would not be limited. While this is not strictly true (a constitution operating only on the conscience of the legislature,
II.XXVIII, p. 426.
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being a very powerful check), yet the founders of the Constitution deemed it necessary for their security, that this should
be done. With this thought in mind they cast about for .a
co-ordinate department in which to deposit the legislative
power which they were withholding from the legislative
department, and naturally decided upon the judiciary, which,
as is easily seen, is peculiarly well fitted for such a.task. This
is the thought expressed by Hamilton when he says, "The
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province
of the courts."
We conclude, after this cursory examination of the debates
and writings of the men who are responsible for our Conr
stitution.
(i) They recogniged that the power to interpretauthoritatively
the laws passed by the legislature was a power naturally belonging to that body.
(2) They desired to withhold that power from the legislature
in order to further limit that department.
(3) They finally made provision for this power to be vested
in the jtdiciary, because that departmentwas deemed best fitted
to carry out this purpose.
We close the discussion by remarking, once more, that
as the power is in its nature a legislative power, it is not
changed because it is exercised through the medium of the
judiciary.
C. Concluding observations.
We now approach the end of the discussion of the principle involved in Gelpcke v. Dubuque. As we have previously
pointed out, the case rests upon the theory that the function
of state courts when declaring legislative acts void, is of a
legislative character. This section has been devoted to an
investigation of the soundness of that theory. We have shown
() That in all nations except the United States the power to
interpret their own laws actually belongs to the legislative
department.
(2) That the power grantedto the courts by the federal Con-
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stitution was recognized, by its framers, to be a legislativejudicialpower.
In considering the second point, we have discussed more
particularly the federal courts. The same reasoning, however,
will apply to the state courts, even more forcibly. First,
because state constitutions are modelled after the federal Constitution, and, secondly, because the state governments are
inherent sovereignties.
When we conclude that the function of declaring acts
invalid is a legislative function, we do not mean to say that
it is not performed in a judicial manner. From its very
nature, it must be. In countries where the legislature possesses the power to interpret its own laws, it always calls in
the aid of judges to assist it in determining between the law
and the constitution. Nor would we wish to have it supposed
that we are not in favor of that wise and far-seeing policy,
which gave this important power to a functionary so able to
exercise it.
But, at the same time, we insist that this power should be
recognized in its true character. The fundamental difference
between our government and the governments of all other
countries, is that their constitutions are binding only on the
consciences of their legislative bodies. The framers of our
Constitution had learned by experience to fear a legislature
limited only by its own judgment as to its powers. This was
the moving cause of the constitutional provision.
Recognizing, therefore, the power to be legislative, on principle, its exercise should be given the effect of a legislative
enactment. And this is precisely what the courts have done
ever since the first case arose, where rights depended upon
the view taken of the nature of this power. All through the
cases we find the expression continually repeated, "a change
of judicial interpretation should be given the same effect as a
legislative amendment." It has been consistently asserted
that a "state can impair the obligation of contracts, no more
by decisions of its courts, than by legislative acts." Thus
continually recognizing, without actually saying it, that the
two stand, in this regard, upon an equal footing. The courts
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have reached this conclusion because they realize that any
other course would be most unjust to the individual, and most
dangerous in its influence upon the state. But that they have
not fully accepted the court's action to be legislative in its
intrinsic character,is inferrible from their action in refusing
writs of error to state courts.
The application to Gelpcke v. Dubuque is plain. . The later
decision of the Iowa court declaring the act invalid, was -of
course an exercise of the legislative prerogative of the
Supreme Court of a state. It was, therefore, exactly in the
position of a repealing act, and if given retroactive effect, it
would impair the obligation of contracts entered into before.
its enactment.
The Circuit Court did so apply it. 'The Circuit Court, therefore, gave it such an effect that it did impair the obligation of
contracts. Therefore the Supreme Court very properly said,
"This amendment to the law, promulgated by the State of
Iowa, you have so applied to a contract, as to impair its obligation. Therefore we will reverse you. This amendment is
valid as to the future, but cannot affect vested rights which
are protected by the federal Constitution."
Our final conclusion is that Gelpcke v. Dubuque is sound,
not only because the peculiar rule as there laid down has
never been contradicted by any court or by any principle of
law applicable to it, but because, starting from a priori
grounds, we arrive on principle at the same conclusion.
We cannot close the subject, however, without devoting a
closing section to a discussion of the anomalous position of
the Supreme Court, in refusing to allow writs of error to
state courts in cases similar to Gelpeke v. Dubuque.
Thomas Raeburn White.
(To be continued.)

